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STATE ECONOMIC AID TO STRIKERS:
PERMISSIBLE OR PREEMPTED?
Payment of unemployment compensation and welfare benefits to
striking workers has sparked considerable controversy over the last four
years. While the majority of states allow some type of welfare payments'
to strikers, only five states extend unemployment compensation2 to
them.
Strikers are disqualified from receiving state economic aid for a varie-
ty of reasons.3 Many state legislatures seek to preserve state neutrality in
labor disputes reasoning that granting benefits to strikers is tantamount
to taking sides in labor conflicts. Benefits to strikers are also perceived
as threatening the fiscal integrity of the unemployment trust fund and
undermining its purpose, which is to aid those involuntarily unemployed.
Some conclude that by choosing to strike, a striker becomes voluntarily
unemployed .4
1. The major source of welfare aid to strikers is the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children-Unemployed Fathers program. This program received federal authorization
under a 1961 amendment to Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). Of
the 29 jurisdictions participating in this program, only nine deny benefits: Arkansas,
Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, West Virginia, and Guam.
Interview with Catherine Miller, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in
Washington D.C. (Aug. 1, 1977).
2. New York and Rhode Island grant eligibility after an eight and a seven week
period, respectively. N.Y. § 591 (Consol. Ann. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-1-6--(1971).
Michigan allows payments if there has been bona fide interim employment. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 421.29(8) (Supp. 1977). New Mexico and Hawaii permit compensation only
if there has not been a stoppage of work at the employer's business. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-9-5(d) (Supp. 1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 383-30(4) (1968).
The stoppage of work disqualification had its origins in British law. See Hawaiian Tel.
Co. v. Hawaii Dept. of Labor & Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275, 287 (D. Hawaii 1975).
Under the British interpretation of the word "stoppage," the worker is disqualified as
long as the job remains vacant. Workers cannot receive benefits unless they are perma-
nently replaced or their jobs are eliminated. The U.S. courts, however, have broadened
the British rule to provide payments even when employees have not been replaced. The
crucial factor has become not whether a striker's job remains vacant, but whether the
employer could maintain business in spite of the strike. Id. at 286-89.
3. For a comprehensive discussion of the underlying reasons for disqualifications of
strikers, see Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification,
17 U. CHI. L. REV. 294 (1949-50). An excellent analysis of the different programs that
extend aid to strikers can be found in Carney, The Forgotten Man on the Welfare Role: A
Study of Public Subsidies for Strikers, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 469 (1973).
4. While undoubtedly an individual worker in a large labor organization may not have
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The Supreme Court in 1974 called attention to the effects of state
economic aid to strikers in Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle.5 The
Court took judicial notice of the impact of welfare benefits to strikers
and called for a clear determination as to whether state laws extending
such benefits were preempted by federal labor policy. Just two years
later, however, the Court in Kimbell Inc. v. Employment Security
Commission6 dismissed an appeal of a New Mexico case upholding
unemployment compensation to strikers "for want of a substantial feder-
al question.
Federal courts were divided as to the implications of Kimbell. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York in New York
Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor,7 and the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Dow Chemical Co. v.
Taylor8 both distinguished the state unemployment compensation stat-
utes under consideration from the New Mexico statute in Kimbell. The
Third Circuit, however, in reconsidering Super Tire Engineering Co. v.
McCorkle9 read Kimbell much more broadly and concluded that it fore-
closed further preemption adjudication of either unemployment compen-
sation or welfare benefits.
In June of 1977, the Supreme Court issued two opinions shedding light
on the implications of Kimbell. Although neither Batterton v. Francis'°
nor Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. HodoryII dealt directly with
the preemption of benefits to strikers, the Court's language suggested
that the preemption issue was not foreclosed by Kimbell. This interpre-
tation has recently been supported by the Second Circuit in its con-
sideration of New York Telephone on appeal.' 2
voted for the strike and therefore has not "chosen" to strike in any meaningful sense of
the word, such workers do have a certain amount of freedom regarding the strike. When
the collective bargaining agreement or the union's constitution have not defined the
circumstances under which a member can resign from the union, it is an unfair labor
practice for the union to fine employees who had resigned their union membership in
order to work during a strike. NLRB v. Local 1029, Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
Non-union members represented by a union who return to work during a strike cannot be
fined at the union's urging if they have continued to pay required fees to the union. NLRB
v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975).
5. 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
6. 429 U.S. 804 (1976) (mem.).
7. 434 F. Supp. 810, 822-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
8. 428 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
9. 550 F.2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1977) (on remand from the Supreme Court), petition for
cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3110 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1977) (No. 76-1684).
10. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
11. 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
12. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388, 391 n.2 (2d.
Cir. 1977).
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I. FEDERAL LABOR POLICY AND THE PREEMPTION ISSUE
The National Labor Relations Act 13 (NLRA) attempted to rectify the
imbalance of economic power between management and labor and thus
encourage industrial stability. 4 The national labor policy, as set forth in
the Act, was to encourage the practice of collective bargaining and
worker self-organization. 15 The Act gave employees 6 the right to organ-
ize, made collective bargaining compulsory, and prohibited certain em-
ployer conduct as unfair labor practices.' 7 The increased strength of
unions and the industrial strife following World War ii, however, led to
the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act 8 (the Taft-
Hartley Act), designed to promote the public interest in industrial stabili-
ty by protecting the rights of management as well as those of labor. The
final major federal labor management relations act, the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195919 (the Landrum-Griffin Act),
continued to define the boundaries of permissible conduct 20 but left the
major provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act unchanged.
13. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970)).
14. See Findings and Declarations of Policy, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
15. Section 1 of the Act-maintained in all subsequent amendments--establishes the
federal labor policy:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
The Taft Hartley Act's additions to § I make it clear that labor as well as management can
obstruct interstate commerce and that both parties are responsible for the effectuation of
the Act's policies.
16. Employees covered by the Act are defined under § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
Under this definition, strikers do not lose their employee status when out of work due to
labor disputes or unfair labor practices.
17. Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to self-organization for collective
bargaining purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 8 defines unfair labor practices. 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1970). Such practices include interference with the employees' exercise of
§ 7 rights; domination or interference with labor organization; discrimination regarding
employment which encourages or discourages union membership; and refusal to bargain
collectively.
18. 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-67, 171-97 (1970)). This Act
amended the NLRA in significant ways, most notably by prohibiting certain union ac-
tivities as unfair labor practices. Secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes were
outlawed. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(7) (1970). A union was also considered to have committed
an unfair labor practice when it restrained or coerced employees from choosing not to
participate in organization and concerted activities guaranteed by § 7. Id at § 158.
19. 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970)).
20. The Act placed still more restrictions on unions. Union members were granted a
19781
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Federal labor policy today thus focuses on maintaining a balance of
strengths between management and labor, with an emphasis on collec-
tive bargaining as the most effective method to maintain industrial stabil-
ity. Implicit in the federal labor policy is the recognition that economic
pressure is crucial in achieving a workable collective bargaining process.
As the Supreme Court recognized, "the use of economic pressure by the
parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception to some policy of
completely academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel
of the process of collective bargaining."-21
The extent to which federal labor law preempts state regulation of
labor or management has been the subject of much litigation. The first
definitive analysis of the issue occurred in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon 22 when the Supreme Court announced that conduct
arguably protected by the NLRA as an organizational right or prohibited
as an unfair labor practice is outside the reach of state or federal court
regulation. Both states and the federal judiciary must defer in such
instances to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. 23
Certain activities, however, are clearly neither protected nor pro-
hibited by federal labor law and therefore the Garmon test is inapplica-
ble. An early Supreme Court decision indicated that such activity is
regulable by the states, 24 but later decisions indicated that by choosing
not to prohibit certain activities, Congress had deemed them permissible
and therefore also outside the scope of state regulation. 25 This second
line of cases indicated that a different preemption standard is used
regarding economic pressures applied by management or labor. Thus
certain conduct is unregulable not because it is directly protected or
prohibited by federal law but because it is considered "permitted.' '26
A recent Supreme Court decision expressly affirmed that Congress did
"bill of rights" under which unions were more closely regulated. In addition, the Taft-
Hartley Act was amended, resulting in the tightening up of secondary boycott prohibitions
and the restriction of organizational and recognitional picketing. This Act undoubtedly
went the farthest in restraining the power of unions.
For a recent analysis of current federal labor law, see F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY,
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (1977).
21. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960). See also NLRB v.
Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972).
22. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
23. Id. at 245.
24. Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs-Stratton), 336
U.S. 245 (1949).
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); NLRB. v. Insurance
Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
26. See BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, supra note 20, at 26-27.
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indeed intend to leave some activities unregulated by "any governmental
power" 27 and controlled by only the " free play of economic forces. ' ' 28
The Court in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission29
recognized that Congress, in order to achieve a proper balance of power
between management and labor, had selected which forms of economic
pressure should be prohibited; those left unrestricted are considered
permissible.3" Thus, a state attempting to prohibit the use of economic
weapons left unrestricted by Congress is "not merely filling a gap when
it outlaws what federal law fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to an
economic contest a weapon that Congress meant him to have avail-
able." 3 The Court stressed that neither states nor the NLRB is afforded
flexibility3 2 in determining which economic weapons are prohibited, for
neither can rebalance or readjust the economic power left by Congress to
either management or labor even though one may appear economically
weaker in certain instances. 3
Although under either a Garmon or a Machinists analysis, states are
precluded from regulating a significant number of labor or management
activities, both theories recognize that certain activities are still within a
state's power to regulate. In Garmon, the Court noted that states are free
to regulate activity which is "a merely peripheral concern" of federal
labor law. 34 They also may regulate "conduct touch[ing] interests...
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." 35 The Court in
Machinists expressly upheld those same exceptions for the "permitted
activity" preemption situations. 36 Machinists suggests, however, that
the state interest exception is limited to "policing of actual or threatened
violence to persons or destruction of property," 37 or to the traditional
27. Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 141
(1976).
28. Id. at 140, quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. at 144.
29. 427 U.S. 132. The economic activity in question in Machinists was the union's
concerted refusal to work overtime-an unprotected activity. The Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Commission had enjoined the union from continuing to refuse to work
overtime pursuant to a union policy of pressuring the employer during negotiations for
renewal of an expired collective bargaining agreement. 67 Wis. 2d 13, 14-16, 226 N.W.2d
203, 204 (1975).
30. 427 U.S. at 140 n.4, quoting Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent
Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469, 478 (1972).
31. Id. at 150, quoting Lesnick, supra note 30, at 478.
32. Id. at 149, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. at 498.
33. Id. at 149. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
34. 359 U.S. at 243.
35. Id. at 244.
36. 427 U.S. at 136, 137.
37. Id. at 136.
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regulation of the streets and highways. 38
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congressional legislative history does not clearly indicate if state
economic aid to strikers is an impermissible action that readjusts
economic weapons or is a permissible action within a state's power to
regulate. The House version of the Taft-Hartley Bill provided that strik-
ers accepting unemployment compensation would no longer be con-
sidered "employees" under the Act, for such benefits were a "perver-
sion of the purposes of the social security laws." ' 39 This provision,
however, was dropped in conference without explanation.4 In 1969,
President Nixon proposed 41 to Congress that amendments to the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act 4 2 include a requirement that strikers be denied
unemployment compensation. The House Committee on Ways and
Means, however, deleted the provision when creating a substitute bill.
Chairman Mills in explanation indicated that states should be allowed
latitude in this area. 43 There apparently was no floor amendment or
debate in the House related to the issue. The Senate, in considering
amendments to the Act, apparently never considered the issue.4
Congress has nonetheless shown a willingness to act directly in other
related areas. It has provided in the Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act 45 that only those strikers engaging in wildcat strikes would be dis-
qualified from unemployment benefits. 46 In addition, strikers are also
able to receive food stamps under the Food Stamp Act.47 Thus, Congress
was willing to include expressly strikers under relief programs when it
intended such a result.
Congressional action or inaction on the issue must be explored in the
38. Id. at 137.
39. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1947).
40. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), 1947 U.S. Cong. Service 1135,
1137-39.
41. HEARINGS ON H.R. 12625 BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1969).
42. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11 (1970).
43. 115 CONG. REC. 34106 (1969).
44. See Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 456 (1st Cir. 1973). The defeated
legislative efforts to exclude strikers is not necessarily determinative that Congress
originally intended to authorize such eligibility. While discussing certain unsuccessful
amendments to the AFDC program that would have omitted unborn children from
coverage, the Supreme Court stated that it might be "equally plausible to suppose" that
the original Act had been misinterpreted and that Congress "wanted to make the original
intent clear." Burns v. Aicala, 420 U.S. 575, 586 n. 12 (1975).
45. 45 U.S.C. §§ 351-367 (1970).
46. 45 U.S.C. § 354(a-2)(iii) (1970).
47. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1976).
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larger context of the underlying goals of the federal legislation. Federal
labor laws explicitly require that strikers are still considered employees
for the purposes of the Federal Acts,4 suggesting that the otherwise
ongoing employment relationship is only temporarily interrupted by the
labor dispute. 49 Congress was necessarily aware of this relationship
when it passed the Social Security Act a month after the NLRA. 50 The
unemployment compensation provisions were considered by Congress
as an aid to workers whose unemployment was severed by business
recessions. 5 1 Clearly strikers, who have remained employees, are not
unemployed because of economic recessions. Furthermore, Congress
recognized the need to harmonize the unemployment compensation sys-
tem with federal labor policy and therefore mandated a duty of neutrality
in labor disputes in order for a state to receive tax credit.5 2 Under section
3304(a)(5) of the Act, 53 states could not deny benefits to claimants who
refused to accept work at a struck plant, thus preventing states from
forcing workers to "scab" and therefore interfering with the newly
approved system of collective bargaining.
While the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed
Fathers (AFDC-UF)14 program was obviously not considered by
Congress when enacting the earlier federal labor laws, the legislative
history of the program may be helpful. The Supreme Court recently
noted that exclusion of strikers is consistent with the declared goal of
AFDC-UF-"namely to aid the families of the involuntarily unemploy-
ed." 55 In passing later amendments affecting the program, Congress also
clearly linked eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits with the work and train-
ing incentives 56 authorized in the amendments, noting that the program
48. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
49. Employers must rehire economic strikers who unconditionally apply for reinstate-
ment once their replacements depart unless (1) they have acquired regular and substantial-
ly equivalent employment, or (2) that the employer can prove that the failure to offer full
reinstatement was for legitimate and substantial business reasons. Laidlaw Corp. v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 103 (7th Cir. 1969).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970).
51. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 586, 87 (1937); H.R. Doc. No. 81,
74th Cong., 1st. Sess. 8 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 418, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935); S. REP.
No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935). The program operates by imposing a federal
excise tax on employers. Payments to a state employment fund are credited against the
federal tax.
52. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975). Under the statute, states cannot deny
benefits to individuals who refused to accept employment "[i]f the position offered is
vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute."
53. Id.
54. See note I supra.
55. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 429 (1977).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 606(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975)
19781
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was explicitly designed to reduce dependency on public assistance by
helping those receiving funds improve their employability.5 7 Thus in
order to establish and maintain eligibility, an applicant must be amenable
to job training. Since strikers possess marketable skills and have, by
virtue of the NLRA, maintained a continuing relationship with the em-
ployer, strikers appear clearly outside the class of workers contemplated
by Congress.
Taken as a whole, the congressional intent regarding the preemptive
effects of federal labor policy on either unemployment compensation or
welfare is not clearly discernable. Courts must thus look to the infer-
ences of congressional intent suggested by the broad underlying policies
of the federal labor statutes to determine if an unarticulated congression-
al intent is that such action is preempted. Prior to 1974, the only federal
appellate court to deal with the issue was the First Circuit. Although the
court in 1970 expressed "substantial doubt ' 58 that Massachusetts' grant-
ing of welfare benefits to strikers frustrated federal labor policy, in 1973
it remanded 59 to the district court the question of whether Rhode Island's
policy of granting unemployment compensation to strikers was preempt-
ed. After a thorough review of the pertinent legislative history, the court
concluded that unambiguous congressional intent was lacking, 6° and
therefore the lower court must consider whether such aid "palpably
infringe[s] upon federal labor policy." 61 In both cases, the First Circuit
stressed the need for probative evidence that state economic aid to
strikers interferes with federal collective bargaining policy. 62
III. SUPER TIRE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court first considered the preemption issue with regard
to state economic aid to strikers in Super Tire Engineering Co. v.
McCorkle. 63 The Court reversed an earlier dismissal of a suit charging
that New Jersey welfare assistance' to strikers interfered with federal
57. H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 97, 107-108 (1967); S. REP. No. 744, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 4, 145-146, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2834, 2837.
58. ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 994 (1st Cir. 1970).
59. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).
60. Id. at 457.
61. Id., quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 766
(1945). The court also indicated that in preemption cases in which Garmon does not apply,
courts should use a balancing process whereby "both the degree of conflict and the
relative importance of the federal and state interests are assessed." Id. at 452. The
relevance of this test has undoubtedly been undermined by Machinists.
62. This stress on probative evidence appeared to place such a heavy burden on the
employer that it appeared unlikely a preemption argument could prevail. Carney, supra
note 3, at 508-509.
63. 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
64. The General Public Assistance Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:8-107 to 8-145 (Supp.
[Vol. 27:381
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labor policy. 65 The Court noted the adverse effects such benefits had on
the collective bargaining system: "It cannot be doubted that the avail-
ability of state welfare assistance for striking workers in New Jersey
pervades every work stoppage, affects every existing collective-bargain-
ing agreement, and is a factor lurking in the background of every inci-
pient labor contract." 66 Accepting as given the fact that state aid to
strikers impacts on the bargaining process, 67 the only inquiry the Court
left open is whether such benefits are outlawed by federal labor policy.
The major federal case to follow Super Tire continued, nevertheless,
to stress the need for statistical data to substantiate a claim of preemp-
tion. After finding such data conclusive, the district court in Hawaiian
Telephone Co. v. Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial Relations6
concluded that Hawaii's work stoppage provisions,69 granting unemploy-
ment compensation to strikers when the employer has been able to
maintain substantial operations in spite of the strike, were preempted by
federal labor policy. Noting that a clear determination of congressional
1971-8) (state program); Assistance to Families of the Working Poor, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44:13-1 to 13-13 (Supp. 1977-78) (state program); Assistance for Dependent Children
Law (ADC), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-1 to 10-8 (Supp. 1977-78) (federal-state program
created by § 402 of the Social Security Act). See note I supra.
65. The employers argued that such assistance violated the federal policy of free
collective bargaining expressed in the LMRA and with other federal policy expressed in
the Social Security Act. The district court had dismissed the suit for injunctive and
declaratory relief, holding that Congress was the appropriate forum for the claim, and that
the challenged New Jersey statutes did not violate the supremacy clause. The court of
appeals, 469 F.2d 911 (3rd Cit. 1972), did not reach the merits of the case but, rather,
remanded it with instructions to vacate and dismiss for mootness because the strike had
been settled and the strikers had returned to work. The Supreme Court held the issue was
not moot because the state policies continued to affect the litigant's interests.
66. 416 U.S. at 124.
67. Statistical data and recent analysis support the Court's conclusions. An attitudinal
survey, examined by the district court in New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of
Labor, indicated a "predominant feeling among both union and non-union workers that
because of unemployment insurance in New York State unions can achieve better strike
settlements since [such funds enable] strikers to hold out longer." 434 F. Supp. 810, 816
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). Statistics and expert testimony also supported the conclusion that such
benefits significantly impacted on collective bargaining, the incidence and duration of
strikes, and the costs of settlements. Id. at 816-19. See also Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii
Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275, 277-82 (D. Hawaii 1976).
For a major empirical study of the relationship between state benefits to strikers and
labor-management relations, see A. THIEBLIT & R. COWAN, WELFARE AND STRIKES: THE
USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS TO SUPPORT STRIKERS. See also Carney, supra note 3, at 527-40.
68. 405 F. Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii 1976).
69. The Hawaii statute disqualified individuals for benefits "for any week ... that his
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the
• . .establishment. . . at which he is . . .employed." HAW. REV. STATS. § 383-30 (4)
(1968). For a discussion of work stoppage provisions in general, see note 2 supra.
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intent regarding such benefits could not be made, 70 the court relied on the
* principle that Congress intended economic pressure to be a major force
in collective bargaining. 71 Anticipating Machinists, the court stated that
Congress alone could balance the competing interests and by its interfer-
.ence, Hawaii had irreconcilably intruded into the "federal process of
free collective bargaining." 72
IV. KIMBELL AND ITS AFTERMATH-CONFLICTING DECISIONS
Super Tire and Hawaiian Telephone laid the foundation for other
federal courts to address the preemption issue. The 1976 decision in
Kimbell, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission ,7 however, raised
the question of whether any preemption issue remained to be ad-
judicated. The striker-claimants in Kimbell received unemployment ben-
efits under a New Mexico statute74 which, like the Hawaii statute,
provided benefits unless there was a work stoppage. Although the lower
state court found a work stoppage had occurred, the court went further
to find that payment of compensation would "interfere with the national
policy of federal labor law of encouraging self-organization and collec-
tive bargaining without state interference in the use of economic
weapons available to both labor and management." 75 The New Mexico
Supreme Court summarily reversed the decision on the basis of an earlier
decision 76 which, although discussing unemployment compensation pro-
visions, had focused on criteria for eligibility rather than on the preemp-
tion issue. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for
70. 405 F. Supp. at 288-89.
71. Id. at 283-84.
72. Id. at 290. The court rejected the balancing approach suggested by the First
Circuit. See note 61 supra. It noted that the only inquiry to be made is whether the state
and federal statutes conflict. If they do conflict, even if not directly, the "national scheme
preempts the state power to act." Id. at 284 (footnote omitted).
73. 429 U.S. 804 (1976).
74. N.M. Unemployment Compensation Law of 1936, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-9-5(d)
(Supp. 1975).
75. Kimbell, Inc. v. Employment Security Comm'n, No. 6-73-08568, slip op. at 9
(N.M. Dist. Ct., 2d Dist., filed October 11, 1974).
76. Albuquerque-Phoenix Express, Inc. v. Employment Security Comm'n, 88 N.M.
5%, 544 P.2d 1161 (N.M. 1975). The only mention of preemption in this case was in a
footnote which criticized the decision in Hawaiian Tel. Co., arguing that the decision
"totally overlooks the fact that in order to qualify for unemployment compensation a
striker must be available and actively seeking work." 88 N.M. at 600 n. 1, 544 P.2d at 1165
n. 1. This position ignores the business reality that other employers are not usually willing
to hire strikers, recognizing that they will normally return to work when the strike is
settled. Furthermore, in New York at least, little effort is made to enforce this require-
ment because the state prefers to keep an employer's labor force intact during a strike.
New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 434 F. Supp. 810, 819. (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
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"want of a substantial federal question." Three justices would have
noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument. 77
Lower courts have been split in their interpretation of Kimbell. The
district courts in New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department
of Labor78 and in Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor79 took the position that
Kimbell is only authority for upholding a statute with a work stoppage
clause such as New Mexico's.8 0 They stressed that the New York8' and
Michigan8 2 statutes, unlike the New Mexico statute, grant benefits re-
gardless of whether the employer's business has been halted. The Sec-
ond Circuit, although reversing the New York district court in New York
Telephone on its preemption findings, nonetheless agreed that Kimbell
was not dispositive of the preemption issue.8 3
The district court in Dow Chemical found Kimbell not controlling and
denied the State Employment Commission's motion for summary judg-
ment, thus leaving the preemption issue to be resolved by the court. The
New York district court, finding Kimbell inapplicable, struck down the
state statute, noting that the state interests for maintaining compensation
77. 429 U.S. 804 (1976) (Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens).
78. 434 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
79. 428 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
80. In their efforts to distinguish the New York and Michigan statutes from the New
Mexico statute, both district courts ignore the obvious argument that in allowing benefits
to strikers if the employer's business remains functioning, the states are still subsidizing a
strike. The fact that the employer is able to continue production lowers the economic
impact of the strike; granting benefits serves to neutralize that advantage gained and
undermines the employer's economic strength. If the Supreme Court were indeed uphold-
ing a work stoppage condition, it may have been speaking only to a restrictive, virtually
unused statute such as New Mexico's rather than speaking to a more broadly applied work
stoppage clause such as Hawaii's.
81. N.Y. LAW § 591 (Consol. Ann. 1977). Central to the conclusion reached by the
district court in New York Tel. Co. was the court's finding that the New Mexico law,
unlike New York's, did not allow expectations of payments upon which "employees
could reasonably predicate labor dispute strategy," 434 F. Supp. at 823, for benefits were
determined after the strike had terminated. Also persuasive to the court was the fact that
the Security Commission had only allowed payments to strikers in three instances in its
history. Furthermore, although the New York court took great pains to distinguish the
two statutes, it also stressed that the New Mexico Supreme Court decision was only a
summary reversal, citing a case which had dealt "entirely with state issues." Id.
82. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.29(8) (Supp. 1977). The Michigan court noted that
the Supreme Court could have decided "the New Mexico statute presented no problems
only because it contained a provision disqualifying strikers in the event of a successful
strike." 428 F. Supp. at 90. New York grants benefits after an eight-week waiting period,
while Michigan does so if the striker has obtained bona fide interim employment. "In
1974, the Michigan statute was amended to define 'bona fide interim employment' as
being of at least two weeks duration at wages equaling the claiman [sic] potential
unemployment benefits." Id. at 88 n.2.
83. New York Tel.Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388, 391 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1977).
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were insubstantial 4 and that government neutrality is violated when the
state extends financial aid to either side.85 The Second Circuit, however,
reversed the lower New York court without reaching the substantive
arguments regarding state interests and government neutrality. The court
indicated that congressional intent, far from being ambiguous, was in-
stead "relatively onesided. ' '8 6 Disagreeing with the lower court, the
Hawaii district court, and the First Circuit, the Second Circuit found that
Congress has evinced an intention to leave the states free to regulate in
the area of unemployment compensation.8 7
Only the Third Circuit, in considering Super Tire on remand, has
found that the Kimbell decision foreclosed any further discussion of
preemption. 8 After the Supreme Court remanded, the district court held
that New Jersey's practice of paying welfare benefits to strikers was not
inconsistent with either federal labor or welfare policy.89 On appeal, the
Third Circuit concluded that the employer's claims of preemption, re-
gardless of "[w]hatever merit this argument might have had in the past"
were foreclosed by the Kimbell decisionY0 After examining briefs and
documents, the court stated that when the Supreme Court dismissed
Kimbell the "necessary predicate . . was a determination that federal
labor policy did not preclude the payment of unemployment compensa-
84. The court argued that "administrative convenience" is not sufficient to allow the
state to subvert the "avowed purpose" of the New York law-to aid those persons
involuntarily unemployed. 434 F. Supp. at 818. The administrative convenience to which
the court referred was established through the testimony of a member of the Legislative
Advisory Committee which had aided in drafting the state law. He stated that the major
reason for granting unemployment compensation to strikers was that future adminis-
trators were deemed too unsophisticated in labor disputes to determine whether a labor
dispute was a strike or a lockout or whether the employee was a striker, a locked-out
employee, a sympathy striker, or someone else affected by the dispute. Id.
85. The court stressed that free collective bargaining was premised on government
noninterference and neutrality. Because the use of economic force was intended to be a
factor in reaching agreement in collective bargaining, the government interferes wrongly
when it extends aid to strikers. Id. at 820.
86. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d at 391.
87. Id. at 395. The court stressed that Congress' failure to forbid payments when it
had been urged, its express granting and denying of benefits in other instances, and its
undoubted awareness of New York's longstanding practice of extending benefits indi-
cated that Congress decided to tolerate the "conflict between New York's statute and the
broad federal policy of free collective bargaining." Id.
88. 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3215 (Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-
1684).
89. 412 F. Supp. 192, 195-98 (D.N.J. 1976).
90. 550 F.2d at 905. The appellants in Super Tire [II] contended that the federal issue
was not properly raised before the state supreme court, or if raised, was not properly
decided. The court responded that the federal issue was indeed properly raised, as
indicated in the briefs, and while it may not have been discussed, it was nonetheless
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tion to strikers." 91 Reasoning that unemployment compensation is more
disruptive to the collective bargaining process than welfare benefits, the
court concluded that if the former was not preempted, then the latter
were necessarily also not precluded: the "greater includes the lesser."
92
V. IMPLICATIONS OF HODORY AND FRANCIS
In May and June of 1977 the Supreme Court issued two decisions on
related issues that suggest, albeit indirectly, that the preemption issue of
state aid to strikers remains in need of adjudication. 93 In Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services v. Hodory9l the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio
statute denying unemployment compensation to workers whose unem-
ployment was "due to a labor dispute" but who neither participated in,
had any interest in, nor stood to gain anything from a strike.
95
decided since the Supreme Court -would not have entertained jurisdiction if the validity of
the state law had not been timely drawn in question on federal grounds or if there had been
no "decision"- in favor of the validity of the state law. The Third Circuit did not discuss
why it considered the Supreme Court to have reversed its strong position in the original
Super Tire case which clearly called for adjudication of the preemption issue. Id. at 906-
08.
91. Id. at 906.
92. Id. at 908.
93. The Second Circuit cited these cases, Ohio Bureau of Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S.
441 (1977) and Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977), as indicating that Kimbell did
foreclose the preemption issue. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor,
566 F.2d at 391 n.2.
94. 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
95. Hodory was laid off because his steel plant could not obtain sufficient coal due to a
coal miners' strike. Both the mine and Hodory's plant were owned by U.S. Steel, although
Hodory was not in the same union as the mine workers. Id. at 473. Unlike the laws of most
states, Ohio's statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (1973), contained no
escape clause for workers such as Hodory who were unemployed involuntarily due to a
strike at another plant owned by the same employer. Only North Carolina has as restric-
tive a statute as Ohio. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(5) (1973). See In re Abernathy, 259 N.C.
190, 130 S.E.2d 292 (N.C.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 161 (1963). The Ohio statute was
amended in 1975 to create a less harsh result for workers such as Hodory, but the
amendment was not retroactive.
Most other states followed the format in the draft bills of the Social Security Board after
the passage of the Social Security Act. The pertinent language reads:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits when unemployed due to a labor
dispute unless he is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the
labor dispute. . . and he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which,
immediately before commencement of the stoppage, . . .were participating
Social Security Board, Draft Bills for State Unemployment Compensation of Pooled
Funds and Employer Reserve Account Types (Rev. Ed. 1937). In addition, several states
grant compensation when unemployment is the result of a lockout rather than a strike. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1105(f) (1976); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1262 (Deering 1956),
construed in Bunney's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. California Empl. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151
P.2d 244 (1944); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-109 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 341.360(1) (Supp.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 27:381
Upholding the state's right to withhold unemployment compensa-
tion,96 the Court stated that "the fact that Congress has chosen not to
legislate on the subject of labor dispute disqualifications confirms our
belief that neither the Social Security Act nor the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act intended to restrict the States' freedom to legislate in this
area."" The Court nevertheless deliberately refrained from considering
whether federal labor laws preempted such state action. 98 The Court did
recognize, however, the detrimental effect of unemployment compensa-
tion on employers:
[I]t must be recognized that effects less than pushing the
employer to bankruptcy may be rationally viewed as undesir-
able. The employer's costs go up with every laid-off worker
who is qualified to collect unemployment. The only way for the
employer to stop these rising costs is to settle the strike so as to
return the employees to work. Qualification for unemployment
compensation thus acts as a lever increasing the pressures on an
employer to settle a strike. 99
The Court further noted that these impacts on the employer must be
given consideration when evaluating the Ohio statute: "the Court must
view its consequences, not only for the recipient of benefits, but also for
the contributors to the fund and for the fiscal integrity of the fund."'10
1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6(e) (1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.29(8) (Supp.
1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(l)(a) (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(d)
(Purdon 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(d) (1974), construed in Teamsters Locals 222 &
976 v. Board of Rev., Dept. of Empl. Sec., 10 Utah 2d 63, 348 P.2d 558 (1960).
For a persuasive discussion of why lockouts should be treated as strikes for the
purposes of unemployment compensation, see Carney, supra note 3, at 499.
96. Hodory argued that the Ohio statute conflicted with provisions of the Social
Security Act and violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, claiming that the states may not deny benefits to workers who are unemploy-
ed through no fault of the worker. Hodory based this argument on 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1)
(1970) which requires the Secretary of Labor to make no certification for payment of
federal funds to state unemployment compensation programs unless state law provides for
methods of administration that the Secretary finds are reasonably calculated to insure full
payment of unemployment compensation "when due." Hodory argued that payment was
"due" him. Although Hodory also pointed to the legislative history of the Social Security
Act, to draft bills issued by the Social Security Board, and to previous language of the
Court, see California Dep't of Human Resource Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130
(1971), the Court nonetheless indicated that numerous other 'innocent' claimants are
disqualified and that the solvency of the unemployment compensation funds is crucial to
the state. 431 U.S. at 489-90.
97. Id. at 488-89.
98. In a footnote at the beginning of the opinion, the Court stated, "at no point in this
litigation has appellee claimed that 4141.29(D)(1)(a) conflicts with or is preempted by any
provision of the National Labor Relations Act. . . .We do not today consider or decide
the relationship between that Act and a statute such as 4141.29(D)(l)(a)." Id. at 475 n.3.
99. Id. at 492.
100. Id. at 491.
1978] State Economic Aid to Strikers
Although the Court upheld Ohio's action by applying the rational basis
test, it noted that the key consideration in evaluating Ohio's approach is
state neutrality in labor disputes. 10 1 By highlighting the effects of the
state aid to strikers (or those laid off due to a strike), the Court indirectly
affirmed its position in Super Tire that the preemption issue remains in
need of court adjudication. °2 For while Hodory is not a labor law
preemption case, the language used by the Court in reaching its decision
suggests that state benefits to strikers do interfere with the national labor
policy of neutrality and, as such, should be preempted.
The subsequent Batterton v. Francis1 3 decision also indicates that the
Kimbell case did not shut the door on preemption adjudication. In
Francis, the Supreme Court upheld an HEW regulation that gave states
participating in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unem-
ployed Fathers (AFDC-UF) program the option of denying benefits to
families if the unemployed father would be ineligible for state unemploy-
ment compensation. 104
Francis focused on the extent to which the Secretary of HEW could
allow the states to determine the eligibility of unemployed workers for
AFDC-UF. The 1968 amendment to section 407(a) of the Social Security
101. The Court stated that "regardless of our views of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of
this form of state 'neutrality' in labor disputes, we cannot say that the approach taken by
Ohio is irrational." Id. at 492.
102. By again stressing the destructive effects of state aid to strikers, the Court
appears to indicate that probative evidence is not necessary before the preemption issue
can be reached.
103. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
104. The original suit in 1971 (Francis[I]), prior to the HEW regulation, challenged a
Maryland regulation that denied benefits to families if the father was ineligible for
unemployment compensation. The two original plaintiffs, one ineligible because unem-
ployed due to a strike and the other discharged because of misconduct, alleged that the
regulation violated the equal protection clause. While the district court sustained the
constitutionality of the regulation, it nonetheless invalidated the state regulation because it
was contrary to HEW regulations which defined eligibility through an hours-of-work test.
340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md. 1972). The Supreme Court affirmed the decision. 409 U.S. 904
(1972). HEW subsequently revised its regulations to allow the states the option of pre-
scribing such limitations. The express purpose of the revised regulation was to nullify the
district court's ruling. When the state moved to dissolve the court's injunction, however,
the district court denied the motion on the ground that HEW's amended regulation was in
conflict with the federal statute. The court held that the state violated the statute by
denying aid to those persons unemployed due to misconduct, because those individuals
are necessarily unemployed within the meaning of the statute: "a father who is discharged
for cause by his employer is unemployed." 379 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D. Md. 1974)
(Francis[II]) (emphasis in original). Further, the court held that the statute was also
violated by denying aid to strikers because the federal regulation giving the state that
authority impermissibly delegated to the states the ability to set standards in violation of
the express purpose of the Act-to provide a national uniform standard. Id. at 82. See
also Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. at 420-24.
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Act'0 5 had concentrated on taking away some of the power that had
originally rested with the states. 106 The amendment provided for "unem-
ployment" to be defined by standards prescribed by the Secretary rather
than by the states. 0 7 The Court held that while the amendment delegated
the power to define unemployment to the Secretary, the Secretary was
not required to exercise this power. The Court stressed that decision-
making by the states is not violative of the purposes of the Act: "the goal
of greater uniformity can be met without imposing identical standards on
each State."'0 8 A strong dissent by Justices White, Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens pointed to the legislative record as a clear indication that
Congress intended the Secretary to create a federal definition of "unem-
ployment." They argued that allowing the states to define the terms for
purposes of eligibility defeats the purpose of the amendment and "in-
vites the very diversity in coverage that the 1968 amendment was design-
ed to prevent."' 10 9
Francis is significant to the labor policy preemption issue in several
respects. First, the Court sanctioned the denial of benefits to strikers
when it noted that HEW has "incorporated a well known and widely
applied standard for 'unemployment' " by allowing states to exclude
those ineligible for unemployment compensation." 0 Such exclusion is
clearly within HEW's authority, for "[e]xclusion of individuals who are
out of work as a result of their own conduct and thus disqualified from
state unemployment compensation is consistent with the goal of AFDC-
UF-namely, to aid the families of the involuntarily unemployed."'
Moreover, the Court qualified its approval of the regulation by stating
the regulation was valid "to the extent it allows the States to determine
that persons disqualified under unemployment compensation laws are
not 'unemployed' under § 407(a)." ' 1 2 This leaves open the question of
whether a striker can be "unemployed" section 407(a)-and thus re-
ceive benefits-when not disqualified from receiving unemployment
compensation. If Kimbell had foreclosed any further discussion of
preemption, the Court undoubtedly would not have left open such funda-
mental issues.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970).
106. 432 U.S. at 430 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 431.
109. Id. at 437.
110. Id. at 428. The Court had previously indicated that the "feature of involuntariness
is often linked with unemployment" and that "state unemployment compensation pro-
grams generally confine their benefits" in the same manner. Id.
111. Id. at 428-29.
112. Id. at 429.
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VI. STATE ECONOMIC AID TO STRIKERS: THE PREEMPTION ISSUE
Under the principles enunciated in Machinists, the crucial question
regarding state economic aid to strikers is whether, by granting such
benefits, the state has denied to the employer an economic weapon
which Congress intended him to have. If Congress has considered
economic pressure used during peaceful strikes to be off-limits to state
regulation, then state action affecting such weapons is clearly an inter-
ference with the balance of power struck by Congress in federal labor
policy and, as such, is preempted.
The starting point, of course, is congressional intent. The Second
Circuit, in finding a congressional intent not to. preempt state action,
ignored the underpinnings of the federal labor law which contemplate
economic warfare as a necessary and often decisive factor in collective
bargaining.113 Congressional inaction in this area and action in related
areas are not dispositive of congressional intent in light of the founda-
tions of the federal labor policy. As the First Circuit indicated when it
found congressional intent ambiguous, "[t]he most that can fairly be
said, in the face of this legislative record, is that Congress has been and
presently is aware of the problem, has had the opportunity to resolve it,
and has acted in closely analogous circumstances.""1
4
While congressional intent is ambiguous regarding the specific issue of
unemployment compensation or welfare benefits, it is crystal clear re-
garding economic pressures used in collective bargaining that are neither
protected nor prohibited: "Congress struck a balance of protection,
prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to union organization, collective
bargaining, and labor disputes that would be upset if a state could also
enforce statutes or rules of decision resting upon its views concerning
accommodation of the same interests." 115 By ignoring the implications
of state aid to strikers on the balance of power struck by Congress, the
Second Circuit ignored the "extent to which federal labor policy and the
federal Act have preempted state regulatory authority to police the use
by employees and employers of peaceful methods of putting economic
pressure upon one another.""16
The loss of salary incurred by the striker is a necessary balance to the
loss of production incurred by the struck employer. An employee cannot
113. See notes 24-38 & accompanying text supra.
114. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 457 (lst Cir. 1973).
115. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 n.4, quoting Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1352 (1972).
116. 427 U.S. at 154.
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work and strike at the same time, since the right to strike requires
strikers to cease working and forego their pay.'" 7 State aid to strikers has
the same effect as a paycheck since it allows strikers to receive economic
benefits while on strike and thus neutralizes the economic strength of
management to withstand the strike by withholding salaries. Such aid
impermissibly interferes with the no-pay weapon granted by Congress to
the employer. Unemployment compensation, in fact, turns the no-pay
weapon against the employer, since in almost all states the unemploy-
ment compensation fund is maintained solely by employer contribu-
tions '1 8 which increase as the number of strikers drawing compensation
increases. The employer suffers a double loss; he not only loses the
economic advantage of withholding pay but is also penalized by being
forced to pay. unemployment benefits to his own strikers.' 9
This analysis is compatible with that of Harvard professor Archibald
Cox, 2' adopted by Justices Powell and Burger in Machinists,'2' and by
the Hawaiian district court in Hawaiian Telephone. 2 2 Cox maintained
that only neutral state laws affecting the labor area-i.e., not accom-
modating the special interests of management, labor, or the public-were
within a 'state's power. When special interests were accommodated, the
balance of power "struck by Congress" was presumably upset and thus
preempted.' 23 The payment of benefits to strikers accommodates the
special interests of strikers. It neutralizes an economic weapon left to the
employer which was to serve a crucial function in maintaining the bal-
ance of power in the collective bargaining process.
The First and Third Circuits have reasoned that welfare benefits fulfill
different needs than do unemployment compensation funds, and that
such benefits intrude less on the collective bargaining process. In ITT
Lamp Division of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Mint-
er,'24 the First Circuit reasoned that welfare benefits meet more basic
subsistence needs and thus address a more fundamental social need than
unemployment compensation, which is not based on demonstrated need
117. Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 1951).
118. For a discussion of how the unemployment system operates, see note 51 supra.
119. As indicated by the district court in Hawaiian Tel. Co., the strikers position when
such benefits are extended is "heads I win, tails you lose!." 405 F. Supp. at 290.
120. Cox, supra note 115.
121. 427 U.S. at 156 (Powell, J., concurring).
122. Hawaii Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275
(D. Hawaii 1976). After adopting Professor Cox's analysis, the Hawaiian court concluded
that because the Hawaii stoppage of work clause inquired directly into the success or
failure of the strike to close down an employer's business, it accommodated the interests
of one group and must be struck down. 405 F. Supp. at 284.
123. Cox, supra note 115 at 1355-1356.
124. 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970).
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but on prior earnings. 125 The Third Circuit, in considering Super Tire on
remand, also followed this rationale.126 Those courts failed to consider
that the impact to the employer is the same if the striker receives either
unemployment compensation or welfare benefits since both are direct
subsidies giving strikers an economic advantage by impermissibly re-
balancing the economic strengths of the parties. Both types of economic
aid interfere with the no-pay weapon granted to the employer. The
Supreme Court in Super Tire recognized the impact of welfare on the
collective bargaining process and indicated that such "need" distinctions
are not relevant to the preemption question, since "it is the basic eligibili-
ty for assistance that allegedly prejudices [the employers'] economic
position." 1
27
States cannot rely on the local interest exception 128 to authorize the
granting of either kinds of benefits. As indicated by Machinists,129 the
state interest exception most clearly applies to violence and public safety
situations. A striker who utilizes his right to strike peacefully does not
fall into this category. Moreover, underlying the principle that economic
warfare is a crucial force in collective bargaining is the necessary recog-
nition that the tenacity of the individual parties in withstanding the
economic pressures is a determinative force in resolving the labor dis-
pute. The economic weakness of a union is therefore not a sufficient
state interest for the granting of aid. As the Supreme Court explained in
Machinists:
[S]elf-help is of course also the prerogative of the employer
because he, too, may properly employ economic weapons
Congress meant to be unregulable . . . . "IT]he Act as pres-
ently drawn does not contemplate that unions will always be
secure and able to achieve agreement even when their economic
position is weak. . . .It cannot be said that the Act forbids an
employer . . . to rely ultimately on its economic strength to try
to secure what it cannot obtain through bargaining.' 130
VII. CONCLUSION
In the time that has elapsed since the 1974 Super Tire decision, several
courts have focused on the issue of whether state economic aid to
strikers is preempted by federal labor policy. Although the Supreme
125. Id. at 995.
126. 550 F.2d at 908.
127. 416 U.S. at 125 n.7.
128. See notes 34-38 & accompanying text supra.
129. Id..
130. 427 U.S. at 147, quoting H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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Court's ambiguous decision in Kimbell led at least one court to consider
that state action is clearly not preempted, the recent Hodory and Francis
decisions suggest that the Supreme Court did not intend to foreclose the
issue. Lower federal courts should again begin the resolution of whether
such aid is preempted. The Supreme Court in Machinists has given these
courts the appropriate framework in which to decide the issue. If those
principles are properly applied, courts will be forced to look at the
narrow question of whether the state interferes when it grants aid to
strikers and thus neutralizes the major economic weapon which manage-
ment employs to counterbalance a strike-loss of salary. If courts apply
the Supreme Court's reasoning and language as developed during the
past four years, they are likely to conclude that loss of salary is an
economic weapon of management that Congress intended to leave unre-
stricted, and interference with this weapon through state economic aid is
preempted.
Joanna Moorhead
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